Relationship of the Case with the Stream of Agency Activities

The roots of the case go back to the earliest days of the Agency when the Sterile Insect Technique (SIT) was developed in conformity with the Agency’s function to “encourage and assist research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful uses throughout the world; …and to make provision … for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy for peaceful purposes … with due consideration for the needs of the under-developed areas of the world;.”[1] Painstakingly, over the first 35 years of the Agency’s history, the technique was created, refined and used experimentally.

As described by Fischer, citing LaChance and Klassen,[2]

Essentially SIT is a novel form of insect birth control. It is specific to the target species, exploiting the behaviour of the insect when it seeks its mate. Insects are mass reared in ‘factories’ and sterilized by gamma rays emitted by a cobalt-60 source. The sterile insects are then released in a controlled manner into nature. Mating between the released, sterile insects and native or ‘wild’ insects are infertile. If enough matings take place the pest population falls and it may eventually be controlled and in some cases eradicated.

The technique had to be developed independently for each species on which it would be tried. Applying it meant overcoming its main limitations which, as described by Fischer, were that “the requirements for its success are extremely demanding and that the mass rearing of certain insect pests, such as moths and certain varieties of butterfly, is very difficult.”[3]

Since the 1960’s, the Seibersdorf Laboratory had been experimenting with small-scale rearing of sterilized insect pests. From the early 1980’s the Laboratories had begun to develop techniques for mass rearing of various species and had begun to apply the technique to deal with infestations of the “New World Screw-worm” in Libya, the Mediterranean fruit fly in Chile. These successes were also accompanied by a failure in Egypt that was mainly caused by matters of project management and Government bureaucracy rather than the technique per se.

The application of the Sterile Insect Technique is based on the areawide concept of integrated insect pest management, a holistic approach of tackling entire pest populations. Due to conceptual reluctance regarding the areawide concept and the concept of eradication, management failures and insufficient attention paid to sustaining results of successful projects were reasons why the technique was not universally accepted by the agricultural community. What was needed was another success in an area that was high in profile. The tsetse fly had such a profile.

The tsetse fly is the carrier of animal trypanosomosis that has retarded cattle production in Africa for centuries, as well as of “sleeping sickness” in humans. Its eradication would have clear and immediate benefits. In fact, the Agency had been working on techniques appropriate for that species and, by the 1970’s had developed membrane feeding technologies that took into account the fly’s unique biology and would permit mass rearing. It had issued research contracts to work on various aspects of the sexing tsetse pupae, improving rearing systems. The Agency technical staff estimates that, unless basic relevant research and development has sufficiently advanced, it can take up to about 15 years to develop species-specific techniques. For tsetse in general and the target species, Glossina tachinoides, in particular, the basic work had been completed by the beginning of the 1990’s.

The insect and pest control subprogramme was part of a long-standing effort at co-operation between the Agency and other UN agencies. The Food and Agriculture Division was the only remaining joint division in the Agency, receiving smaller part of its funding from the FAO and the rest from the Agency budget. While it was the only joint division, it was by no means the only programme that was a joint effort.

It was also one of the Agency programmes where the Agency itself, through the Seibersdorf Laboratories, undertook research directly, rather than contracting it out. In this, the Agency is one of the few organisations of the United Nations system that provides a direct laboratory service to its members.

The subprogramme had considerable, but not exceedingly high levels of resources. In 1994, its resources for various insect pests totalled $2,082,000, compared with $9,528,000 for the Food and Agriculture programme as a whole and $29 million for the whole of the Department of Research and Isotopes. The tsetse fly project itself had, in 1995, a regular budget allocation of $847,000, most of which was for the Laboratory.

The mix of staff costs, research contracts and output is probably typical for a project with technical co-operation applications.

What triggered the new effort

Most management decisions in international organisations are triggered as a result of something in the external environment. In this case it was the sudden abandonment by UNDP and FAO of their own attempt to eradicate the tsetse fly in Zanzibar using conventional means.

In 1986, the FAO, with UNDP funding, had begun an animal disease control project that included the eradication of the tsetse fly in Zanzibar using insecticides. This was a project that was intended to demonstrate the use of new technologies in difficult areas. The project involved applying insecticide to cattle so that when the flies landed on the cattle, they would be killed. It was based on the assumption that cattle were the main hosts for the tsetse fly and that by locating the insecticide there, a simple, cost-effective method of dealing with the insect could be found. At the earliest stages of planning the project, the IAEA had been consulted and IAEA technical staff had recommended a concerted effort to eradicate tsetse on Zanzibar, using insecticide pour-ons and the SIT in a phased, integrated approach. The SIT component was rejected by FAO as being too complicated, too expensive and interfering with the effort to demonstrate the feasibility to eradicate tsetse by using insecticides on livestock. Thus the IAEA had to step back from cooperating in the UNDP-FAO project.

By 1993, the FAO and UNDP had realised that the insecticide approach was not working. The application of insecticide only worked very well in areas, where tsetse mainly fed on domestic animals. But the method had no impact in areas where wild animals, such as bushpigs or small antelopes, were the preferred tsetse hosts. The UNDP-FAO project had suppressed most of the tsetse fly target population but failed to eradicate it. The prospective that farmers would have to continue keeping cattle painted with insecticide was beginning to become burdensome. Moreover, the fact that the insecticides would have to be purchased at international market prices, was making the effort costly for a country trying to reduce its foreign exchange expenditures as part of structural adjustment.

At this point, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, together with the authorities on Zanzibar, and FAO approached the Agency with the possibility that the Agency take over the project, but without UNDP funding. The Agency had to make a quick decision about whether to take over the project.

For the managers in the technical department, the Zanzibar project was appealing. They were convinced that developments in the research programme had made dealing with the tsetse fly feasible. The Agency showed that the SIT was a viable option to other pest control methods. They believed that the technique could be applied quickly. Since Zanzibar is an island, many of the contingencies that might, later on, affect the SIT results effort would not be applicable. Having been involved in the early stages of the UNDP/FAO project, an information base existed that could be used for planning the new project. The results of the SIT project could be compared with the results of the other, conventional eradication effort and demonstrate the cost-effectiveness of the technique.

The managers in the technical co-operation department were interested in the project because it would demonstrate to the Agency’s governments the utility and importance of the Agency in dealing with an important development problem in a developing country that was highly visible. Success would open up additional requests for similar types of technical co-operation. It would also solidify support for the technical co-operation programme that was dependent on extra-budgetary funding.

The technical managers were eager to start the project quickly. While the UNDP/FAO project had not eradicated the tsetse fly, it had substantially suppressed the population and eradication of the fly using the SIT would be, as suggested earlier, a logical next step, as the target population was relatively small. The more time that would pass, the larger the tsetse fly population and the more difficult the job of applying the SIT.

For the technical co-operation department, the problem with a quick startup was that financing of the project was not assured, beyond resources already included in the Agency TC programme. Donors would have to be found. However, in the course of making initial explorations with potential funding sources, one donor was able to make a verbal commitment and on that basis, the technical co-operation department decided to proceed with the project.

How was the action planned?

The managers concerned, from both the technical and the technical co-operation departments, developed the project along standard lines. They designed a three-year project, with four components. These included:

1. Mass rearing of sterile flies;

2. Release into nature primarily by aerial means;

3. Monitoring of the insect population; and

4. Advising.

The project is described in a Factsheet prepared by the Agency.

For each component, the activities that were necessary were set out by the technical staff, based on past experience, and they also assigned costs to all activity components and prepared a project budget that was refined in close collaboration with the staff of the technical co-operation department.

The result was a project with a total cost of $6.6 million over three years. It became the task of the Technical Co-operation Department to find donors to cover the amount. This became a critical task when the initial donor dropped out because of a change in priorities. A major effort to collaborate with FAO at least in the fund raising exercise was not successful.

Then the Technical Co-operation Department took the lead in fund raising. They provided funds from the Agency’s own technical co-operation programme to begin operations and began to look for other sources. Through indirect sources, they learned that funds might be available in an IFAD Loan to Tanzania that was intended to improve livestock raising in Zanzibar, but was not being spent. The Deputy Director-General for Technical Co-operation himself approached IFAD about linking the SIT project to the loan. The Technical Co-operation Co-ordination division took the lead in seeking funds. Staff from the TC department made an effort to learn about the technicalities of the SIT to be able to explain it to potential donors.

The project was planned within the normal parameters of an Agency TC project. This meant that it was assumed that the management of the project would be taken care of by the government counterpart, who would provide staff and equipment. The Agency would provide two short-term consultants, some scientific equipment and the initial stock of sterile flies. As the project developed, many of these assumptions proved to be questionable.

The Agency would also use some of its research money to support the project. This included refinement of rearing techniques in the Seibersdorf Laboratory, and several co‑ordinated research projects. The latter included projects on tsetse attractants, tsetse genetics and tsetse rearing automation. The automation project involved Czech engineers who were able to work directly with the Seibersdorf Laboratory.

How was the action co-ordinated?

By definition, technical co-operation projects involve more than one department and co‑ordination is essential. As a minimum, a technical department is involved, as is the Department of Technical Co-operation. Often the Department of Administration is involved. The high risk and complexity that the Zanzibar SIT project involved led its managers to make a particular effort to achieve a strong working relationship among the concerned departments.

In late 1994, as the project was just becoming operational, a seminar was organised for the staff who would be involved in the project, to explain both the technical and operational details. The Deputy Directors-General of the Departments of Administration, Technical Co-operation and Research and Isotopes, various directors, together with key staff, took part. This served to provide a common understanding of the project and its importance, as well as to give a sense of shared ownership in the project.

This kind of co-operation became quickly important when the project began to experience problems whose solution required a co-ordinated response and unusual flexibility.

The project began slowly because funds dribbled in slowly over the first 12 months. It only became fully operational in May 1995. During the initial period, the colony of sterile flies, that was located on the mainland, was built up and aerial release was tested. The fact that the two main components of the project were physically separated caused an immediate co-ordination problem.

A crisis developed in the project because the mass rearing was not going well. Although the Agency had two people on the project, their attention was often detracted from technical issues, such as dealing with customs problems for urgently needed equipment, and too many activities were not being performed as required. The national project director, who had numerous other tasks, was also not able to focus on the project. The section chief in the technical department believed that the project needed a full-time project manager.

The difficulty was that the policy of the Agency was not to assign long-term experts to technical co-operation projects. Appointing one would require setting a precedent. Eventually the problem was solved by appointing a retired Canadian expert on series of seven-month contracts, with a break in service in between. Thus, technically, the expert was not long-term, but in practice he was. By shuttling between the sites at which the project was taking place, he managed to co-ordinate the various components.

The solution was arrived at by a method that was used successfully throughout the project.

As in all complex activities involving numerous offices, there were disputes about managerial issues. Each department had its own perspective on the project. There is always some tension about who is really in charge of the project and who will receive the credit for success (or blame for the failure). In this case, the managers most involved with the project were convinced that only a team effort would lead to success. A procedure was evolved to bring in representatives of the main offices concerned to meet and reach a solution. This worked remarkably well.

The process was facilitated by the strong support of the Deputy Director-General for Technical Co-operation, who was committed to the success of the project. In return, the project staff made it a point to keep the DDG informed and often brainstormed with him about major policy and operational issues.

Among the parties involved in operations on a regular basis were:

1. The Insect and Pest Control Section, RIFA;

2. The Africa Section, TCPA

3. The Programme Co-ordination Section, TCPC

4. The Entomology Unit of the Seibersdorf Laboratory (developing the small colony and providing assistance to the mass breeding);

5. The Animal Production and Health Section, RIFA (for expertise on veterinary issues);

6. The Animal Production and Health Unit of the Seibersdorf Laborratory for backstopping serological surveys among cattle;

7. The Field Procurement Section, TCPC;

8. The Experts Section, TCP; and

9. Finance and Accounting Section, ADBF

The representatives of the sections would meet on issues, have an open, often heated, discussion and reach a consensus. An informal ground-rule was that the meeting would not end without an agreement and that, whenever disputed or more complex issues were discussed, a minute would be prepared describing what was agreed. While the meeting did not have a formal decision-making authority, the fact that agreements were by consensus meant that they were only infrequently questioned by Section Heads or higher level managers.

This procedure is on the way to becoming institutionalised for other projects under the title of Core Action Teams.

The issues often involved finding flexibility within Agency rules in order to permit the project to overcome obstacles. One of these had to do with the setting up and use of an imprest fund in the field to provide for purchase of needed local equipment, supplies or services. These are normally resisted because it is felt to be the Government’s responsibility to provide equipment locally, there are rules about procurement based on competitive bidding and financial accountability is difficult because of distance. The project personnel in the field, however, argued that the Government procedures were too slow, the Government often lacked funds and that time was of the essence. Eventually, these arguments carried the day and ADBF arranged for quick replenishment of the imprest account whenever it became depleted. The Field Procurement Section was instrumental for obtaining various special items like blood diet for tsetse, even though this was not the usual kind of good that it purchased for projects.

A similar situation ensured with regard to project vehicles. The Government was expected to provide transportation and it was not Agency policy to include vehicles in the project budget. When the Government failed to supply transportation an agreement was made to include vehicles in the project budget.

Also, the Agency team, together with the local counterparts, identified at an early stage of project implementation risk factors and obvious bottlenecks that were likely to affect the insect production at an early stage and developed back-up solutions, including the drilling of a bore hole, the erection of an overhead water tank and the installation of a generator.

One team recommendation was the key for improving the number and quality of mass produced sterile males: production allowances, covered under the IAEA imprest fund and based on the output of sterile males, were introduced to motivate staff.

Another example was where pooling of advice led to the application of very new and innovative wireless technology that allowed the breeding facility on the mainland to communicate directly with the project site on the island as well as with Vienna, including fax machines, radio and e-mail).

What were the major factors in the success?

Looking at the results of the SIT, a number of factors that led to its success can be identified. These include the following.

· The project was selected because it responded to a need that the Agency’s expertise could demonstrably fill.

· The managers involved in the project sensed its importance for the Agency as a whole, and not just their departmental concerns.

· Managers were willing to set aside narrow issues of turf in the pursuit of an agreed, common objective.

· The managers looked at obstacles with a view to overcoming them and at Agency procedures in terms of how these could be used to overcome the obstacles.

· Wherever possible, implementation action had back-up / fall-back options (for example: water well and generator at Tanga, back-up fly production at Seibersdorf, ground releases in case aerial releases would be impossible, various communication back-ups, etc.)

· A procedure, what are now termed “core action teams”, was put in place across department lines that ensured communication among concerned offices and a forum for reaching agreements informally that could then be followed-up formally.

· The project had the strong backing of the most concerned programme managers.

· The project used the regular budget resources of the Agency in focussed but imaginative ways in order to bridge resource gaps.

* The case study is a modified version of a case prepared by John R. Mathiason for the Overview Module of the Management Certificate Curriculum of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the IAEA and is used with permission.

[1] Statute of the IAEA, Articles III.A.1 AND III.A.2.

[2] L.E. LaChance and W. Klassen, “Applying the sterile insect technique to the control of insect pests” IAEA Yearbook 1991, IAEA, Vienna (1991), B23, cited in David Fischer, History of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna: IAEA, 1997, p. 376.