Subject: Biological Weapons Convention

Date: Tuesday, November 20, 2001 10:19 AM

From: PA List Manager <statelists@STATE.GOV>

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Biological Weapons Convention

John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and

International Security Remarks to the 5th Biological Weapons

Convention RevCon Meeting

Geneva, Switzerland

November 19, 2001

Mr. President, the United States congratulates you on your

election, and pledges its cooperation in the vital work before

us. We are here to review the functioning of the Biological

Weapons Convention under circumstances none of us would have

wished and none of us foresaw. Suddenly, all of us are engaged

in a war -- a war that ignores national boundaries and

threatens the very fiber of our societies.

President Bush warned in his recent address to the UN General

Assembly that: "the world faces the horrifying prospect of

terrorists searching for weapons of mass destruction, the tools

to turn their hatred into holocaust. They can be expected to use

chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons the moment they are

capable of doing so." This conference is therefore unfortunately

timely.

We, the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention, must

demonstrate an unwavering commitment to fighting this undeniable

threat. We must overcome years of talking past each other, and

address the real issues. Will we be courageous, unflinching, and

timely in our actions to develop effective tools to deal with the

threat as it exists today, or will we merely defer to slow-moving

multilateral mechanisms that are oblivious to what is happening

in the real world?

The United States has repeatedly made clear why the arms control

approaches of the past will not resolve our current problems.

This is why we rejected the flawed mechanisms of the draft

Protocol previously under consideration by the Ad Hoc Group.

Countries that joined the BWC and then ignore their commitments

and certain non-state actors would never have been hampered by

the Protocol. They would not have declared their current covert

offensive programs or the locations of their illegal work --

nor would the draft Protocol have required them to do so.

Although the United States has been criticized publicly -- both

in the media and by foreign governments -- for rejecting the

draft Protocol, many of those same governments have told us

privately that they shared America's reservations, describing the

draft as "flawed" or "better than nothing." Do we really believe

that a Protocol that would allow violators to conduct an

offensive biological weapons program while publicly announcing

their compliance with the agreement is "better than nothing?"

We think not. We can -- and must -- do better.

Before we consider new ways to strengthen the Biological Weapons

Convention, however, we must first confront the failure of many

states to abide by that very document. Too many states are

parties to the BWC but have not lived up to their commitments.

Any nation ready to violate one agreement is perfectly capable of

violating another, denying its actual behavior all the while.

The United States will simply not enter into agreements that

allow rogue states or others to develop and deploy biological

weapons. We will continue to reject flawed texts like the BWC

draft Protocol, recommended to us simply because they are the

product of lengthy negotiations or arbitrary deadlines, if such

texts are not in the best interests of the United States and many

other countries represented here today.

Straight Talk About BWC Compliance

The most important reason we gather here is to assess compliance

with the BWC provisions outlawing the development, production,

acquisition, stockpiling, or retention of biological weapons and

their delivery systems. While the vast majority of the BWC's

parties have conscientiously met their commitments, the United

States is extremely concerned that some states are engaged in

biological weapons activities that violate the Convention. We

also are concerned about potential use of biological weapons by

terrorist groups, and states that support them. So I plan to

name names. Prior to September 11, some would have avoided this

approach. The world has changed, however, and so must our

business-as-usual approach.

First, we are concerned by the stated intention of Usama bin

Ladin and his al Qaeda terrorist organization to use biological

weapons against the United States. While we do not yet know the

source of the recent anthrax attacks against us, we do know that

some of the September 11 terrorists made inquiries into renting

crop dusters, almost certainly to attack our cities. We also

know that Usama bin Ladin considers obtaining weapons of mass

destruction to be a sacred duty, that he has claimed to possess

such weapons, and that he has threatened to use them against us.

We are concerned that he could have been trying to acquire a

rudimentary biological weapons capability, possibly with support

from a state. While the United States is not prepared, at this

time, to comment on whether rogue states may have assisted a

possible al Qaeda biological weapons program, rest assured that

the United States will not rely alone on treaties or

international organizations to deal with such terrorist groups or

the states that support them. Neither the Biological Weapons

Convention nor the former draft BWC Protocol would stop

biological terrorism by groups like al Qaeda or restrain their

rogue-state patrons.

Beyond al Qaeda, the most serious concern is Iraq. Iraq's

biological weapons program remains a serious threat to

international security. After signing the BWC in 1972, Iraq

developed, produced, and stockpiled biological warfare agents and

weapons, and continued this activity even after ratifying the

BWC in 1991. Despite the obligation to fully disclose and

destroy its BW program which the UN Security Council required to

conclude the Gulf War, Iraq denied having a BW program and

pursued a policy of obstruction, denial and evasion to conceal

its program. Only under increased pressure from UNSCOM and the

looming defection of one of Iraq's weapons directors did Baghdad

admit the existence of its offensive BW program. Baghdad

unilaterally ended UNSCOM weapons inspections and monitoring in

Iraq in December 1998. Even with unprecedented intrusiveness,

UNSCOM, when faced with a nation dedicated to deception and

concealment, unfortunately could not fully dismantle Iraq's BW

program. Its successor, UNMOVIC, is prepared to resume on-site

activities in Iraq, but Saddam Hussein's continued belligerence

prevents it from so doing. The United States strongly suspects

that Iraq has taken advantage of three years of no UN inspections

to improve all phases of its offensive BW program. The existence

of Iraq's program is beyond dispute, in complete contravention

of the BWC. The BWC Protocol would have neither hindered nor

stopped it.

Also extremely disturbing is North Korea's BW program. The

United States believes North Korea has a dedicated, national-

level effort to achieve a BW capability and that it has developed

and produced, and may have weaponized, BW agents in violation of

the Convention. North Korea likely has the capability to produce

sufficient quantities of biological agents for military purposes

within weeks of a decision to do so. While we are hopeful that

Pyongyang will come into compliance with the BWC and end its

program, the fact remains that the BWC has been ineffective in

restraining North Korea. The draft BWC Protocol would have done

no better.

We are also quite concerned about Iran, which the United States

believes probably has produced and weaponized BW agents in

violation of the Convention. The United States believes that

Libya has an offensive BW program in the research and development

stage, and it may be capable of producing small quantities of

agent. We believe that Syria (which has not ratified the BWC)

has an offensive BW program in the research and development

stage, and it may be capable of producing small quantities of

agent. Finally, we are concerned about the growing interest of

Sudan (a non-BWC party) in developing a BW program. The BWC has

not succeeded in dissuading these states from pursuing BW

programs and we believe the draft BWC Protocol would have

likewise failed to do so.

This list is not meant to be exhaustive, but to demonstrate real

challenges left unaddressed by the Biological Weapons Convention.

There are other states I could have named which the United States

will be contacting privately concerning our belief that they are

pursuing an offensive BW program. The United States calls upon

all BWC parties and signatories that have not done so to

immediately terminate their offensive biological weapons programs

and comply fully with their obligations.

New Approaches to the BW Threat

In light of the September 11 terrorist attacks, widespread

violations of the BWC, and the weaknesses of the draft BWC

Protocol, which rendered it incapable of effectively addressing

these serious threats, the United States has crafted alternative

proposals. Just as we can no longer rely solely on traditional

means to fight a war against terrorism, we need to look beyond

traditional arms control measures to deal with the complex and

dangerous threats posed by biological weapons. Countering these

threats will require a full range of measures -- tightened

export controls, an intensified non-proliferation dialogue,

increased domestic preparedness and controls, enhanced biodefense

and counter-bioterrorism capabilities, and innovative measures

against disease outbreaks. Strict compliance by all Parties with

the BWC is also critical.

The United States has a dedicated bio-defense program to ensure

that Americans and our friends and allies are protected against

bioweapons attacks. In light of the recent anthrax attacks, our

efforts will increase. Robust biodefense efforts are necessary

to combat known threats, and to ensure that we have the means to

defeat those specific threats. U.S. bio-defense programs are a

means to an end, to protect Americans and our friends and allies.

An essential element in our strategy is to find agreement in this

body on measures that countries can undertake immediately to

strengthen the BWC. We strongly believe that the key is to

broaden our understanding of the biological weapons threat and

the types of measures that are potentially valuable in countering

it.

U.S. Proposals for Strengthening the BWC National Implementation

(Article IV). Let me begin with measures to strengthen National

Implementation. The United States proposes that Parties agree

to enact national criminal legislation to enhance their bilateral

extradition agreements with respect to BW offenses and to make it

a criminal offense for any person to engage in activities

prohibited by the BWC. While Article IV permits the adoption of

such legislation, it does not explicitly require it. This body

must make clear that doing so is essential.

Further, Parties should have strict standards for the security of

pathogenic microorganisms and: (a) adopt and implement strict

regulations for access to particularly dangerous micro-organisms,

including regulations governing domestic and international

transfers; and (b) report internationally any releases or

adverse events that could affect other countries. Sensitizing

scientists to the risks of genetic engineering, and exploring

national oversight of high-risk experiments, is critical and

timely, as is a professional code of conduct for scientists

working with pathogenic micro-organisms.

Such measures, if adopted and implemented, will contribute

significantly to doing what none of the measures in the draft BWC

Protocol would do: control access to dangerous pathogens, deter

their misuse, punish those who misuse them, and alert states to

their risks. Individually and collectively, they would establish

powerful new tools to strengthen the BWC by enhancing our ability

to prevent the development, production or acquisition of

dangerous pathogens for illegal purposes. These benefits can be

achieved quickly, since implementation does not depend on lengthy

international negotiation.

Consultation and Cooperation (Article V). The United States

seeks to establish a mechanism for international investigations

of suspicious disease outbreaks and/or alleged BW incidents. It

would require Parties to accept international inspectors upon

determination by the UN Secretary General that an inspection

should take place. This would make investigations of such

events more certain and timely. It would also allow us to

acquire internationally what is likely to be the first hard

evidence of either accidental or deliberate use of biological

warfare agents and help ensure that any such event did not get

covered up by the responsible parties.

We are also supportive of setting up a voluntary cooperative

mechanism for clarifying and resolving compliance concerns by

mutual consent, to include exchanges of information, voluntary

visits, or other procedures to clarify and resolve doubts about

compliance.

Assistance to Victims (Article VII) and Technical and Scientific

Cooperation (Article X). Enhanced cooperation with the World

Health Organization would be in everyone's interests. As we are

aware, biosafety standards vary widely throughout the world. The

United States strongly believes every country would benefit from

adopting rigorous procedures, and therefore proposes that Parties

adopt and implement strict biosafety procedures, based on WHO or

equivalent national guidelines. Furthermore, we should enhance

support of WHO's global disease surveillance and response

capabilities. Parties could agree to provide rapid emergency

medical and investigative assistance, if requested, in the event

of a serious outbreak of infectious disease, and to indicate in

advance what types of assistance they would be prepared to

provide.

Restricting access and enhancing safety procedures for use of

dangerous pathogens, strengthening international tools to detect

serious illness and/or potential illegal use of biology and

providing assurance of help in the event of a serious disease

outbreak -- these measures all enhance collective security and

collective well-being -- which is, after all, our ultimate

objective. With the exception of the final measure, none of

these measures was contemplated in the draft BWC Protocol.

The United States believes these proposals provide sound and

effective ways to strengthen the Convention and the overall

effort against biological weapons. These are measures State

Parties can adopt now to make the world safer and proliferation

more difficult. The choice is ours.

Review Conference Objectives To preserve international unity in

our efforts to fight against terrorism and WMD proliferation, we

need to work together, and avoid procedural or tactical

divisiveness during the Review Conference that may hinder

reaching our mutual goal of combating the BW threat. We welcome

all reactions to these ideas, and additional new ways to

strengthen the BWC.

The time for "better than nothing" protocols is over. It is time

for us to consider serious measures to address the BW threat. It

is time to set aside years of diplomatic inertia. We will not be

protected by a "Maginot treaty" approach to the BW threat. The

United States asks the states assembled here to join us in

forging a new and effective approach to combat the scourge of

biological weapons. I have laid out serious proposals that the

United States hopes will form the basis of this new approach. I

ask that these proposals be endorsed in the Final Declaration.

By working together during this Review Conference, by exchanging

ideas and proposals that will help us meet this critical

challenge, I am confident this Convention can succeed in

advancing the worldwide effort to reduce and ultimately eliminate

the biological weapons threat.

Thank you, Mr. President.

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